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OPINION 
________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant Robert Melber appeals the District Court’s dismissal of his 
medical malpractice action for failure to comply with the requirements of the New Jersey 
Tort Claims Act, N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 et seq., (the “New Jersey Act,” or simply the “Act”).  
Though this is a sympathetic case, New Jersey law, which governs this case, would 
stretch too far were we to reverse.   
In May and June of 2009, Melber—a veteran of the United States Navy—received 
two eye surgeries at the U.S. Veteran’s Administration Hospital in East Orange, New 
Jersey.  He subsequently lost vision in his right eye and filed malpractice claims against, 
among others, the two surgeons who performed the operations, Drs. Neelakshi Bhagat 
and Amir Cohen (the “Doctors”).  The Doctors, however, were employees of the State of 
New Jersey through the University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey 
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(“UMDNJ”).  Because sovereign immunity would ordinarily preclude tort claims made 
against these state employees, Melber had to satisfy procedural requirements of the Act to 
abrogate their sovereign immunity.     
 Those procedures were not satisfied.  Although Melber filed notice of his federal 
tort claims, he never filed the notice required by the New Jersey Act.  See N.J.S.A. 59:8-
8(a) (“The claimant shall be forever barred from recovering against a public entity or 
public employee if . . . [h]e failed to file his claim with the public entity within 90 days of 
accrual of his claim except as otherwise provided . . . .”); see also id. at 59:8-9 (“A 
claimant who fails to file notice of his claim within 90 days as provided in section 59:8-8 
of this act . . . may, in the discretion of a judge of the Superior Court, be permitted to file 
such notice at any time within one year after the accrual of his claim[,] provided that the 
public entity or the public employee has not been substantially prejudiced thereby[]” and 
there are “sufficient reasons constituting extraordinary circumstances for his failure to 
file notice of claim within the period of time prescribed”).  Because no required notice 
was ever supplied, the District Court granted dismissal as to the Doctors for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction.
1
  Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).     
Melber argues that it was impossible for him to supply timely notice under the Act 
because he was led to believe that the Doctors were federal—not state—employees 
throughout the entire statutory notice period.  He points to a July 29, 2010 letter from the 
                                              
1
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 
28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2679.  We have jurisdiction under the interlocutory appeal 
provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), and exercise plenary review of the District Court’s 
dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), In re Kaiser Group Int’l Inc., 
399 F.3d 558, 561 (3d Cir. 2005). 
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Department of Veterans Affairs as the first indication that he “was notified that Drs. 
Bhagat and Cohen may have a relationship with UMDNJ.”  Melber’s Br. at 4.  The 
District Court, however, acknowledged this, and concluded that the date of claim accrual 
tolled until July 29, 2010 (the date of the letter).  We agree.  “The discovery rule provides 
that in an appropriate case a cause of action will be held not to accrue until the injured 
party discovers, or by an exercise of reasonable diligence and intelligence should have 
discovered[,] that he may have a basis for an actionable claim.”  McDade v. Siazon, 32 
A.3d 1122, 1131 (N.J. 2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  
Specifically, where a plaintiff-patient had no reason to believe that his physician was a 
public employee, this presents “unique circumstances” that allow the time bar to toll.  
Eagan v. Boyarsky, 731 A.2d 28, 34 (N.J. 1999).  Here, the July 29, 2010 letter explained 
that the Doctors “are contract physicians and not employees of the [federal] Agency,” and 
goes on to name “the contractor” as “UMDNJ.”  J.A. at 38.  Even if this was not full 
notice, reasonable diligence required additional inquiry at that point.  Therefore, because 
Melber did not file any tort claim notice in the year following the July 29, 2010 accrual 
date—or at any time for that matter—his claim is barred under the terms of the Act. 
Melber contends that he should be excused from his failure to file notice.  In 
support of his position, he relies on Eagan, where the Supreme Court of New Jersey 
excused a plaintiff’s failure to file on similar facts.  731 A.2d at 34.  Although facially 
analogous, Eagan does not control here.  In concluding that tolling was warranted for 
obscured public employee status, Eagan forgave the failure to file because the plaintiff 
“undoubtedly believed that a late notice would be barred by the one-year time barrier of 
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N.J.S.A. 59:8–9,” and because he “nonetheless acted promptly to protect his rights.”  Id. 
at 33.  Neither rationale applies to the facts before us.  First, because Eagan clearly 
established that tolling applies under these very circumstances, the justification for 
Eagan’s failure to file—legal uncertainty as to the viability of tolling—no longer exists.  
See, e.g., D.D. v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of New Jersey, 61 A.3d 906, 921 (N.J. 2013) 
(allowing extraordinary circumstances based on “a reasonable, albeit ultimately mistaken, 
perception of the Act’s requirements,” but not on “an attorney’s inattention to a file, or 
even ignorance of the law”).  The bigger problem is that we know of no indication that 
Melber acted promptly to protect his rights on learning that the Doctors were state 
employees.        
  Melber’s arguments aimed at the sufficiency of the evidence establishing the 
Doctors as UMDNJ employees are also unavailing.  As explained, even if the July 29, 
2010 letter did not itself constitute notice, it should have invited additional inquiry.  And, 
there is no serious contention that the Doctors were not actually UMDNJ employees.  See 
J.A. at 181–82 (Doctors’ employment letters).   
Finally, to the extent Melber argues that his federal tort claims notice should 
suffice to provide the notice required by the New Jersey Act, we find no compelling 
support for this proposition.  Instead, the Supreme Court of New Jersey appears to have 
implicitly declined to equate the two unrelated forms of notice.  Cf. Ventola v. New 
Jersey Veteran’s Mem’l Home, 751 A.2d 559, 563–64 (N.J. 2000) (failing to adopt 
federal notice as a timely substitute for state-law notice, but noting that allowing 
substitute notice between state agencies counseled in favor of applying the extended one-
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year filing period pursuant to N.J.S.A. 59:8-9).  Ventola is not our case, and, moreover, 
we are beyond the one-year period after July 29, 2010.      
In this context, because notice was not properly supplied under the Act, we have 
no choice but to affirm the District Court’s order dismissing Melber’s complaint as to 
Drs. Bhagat and Cohen.
2
  
                                              
2
 The parties dispute whether an answer was filed containing the affirmative defense of 
failure to provide notice under the Act.  After considering the submissions of the parties, 
we are satisfied that—whatever transpired before the Superior Court prior to removal—
Melber’s counsel at least received a copy of the answer submitted to the state trial court 
and was on notice of this defense.  See Reale v. Twp. of Wayne, 332 A.2d 236, 240 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1975) (concluding that a failure to provide notice of tort claims “may 
be excused by the court under appropriate circumstances,” and so excusing where 
“[p]laintiffs . . . complained of no surprise or prejudice and the court perceive[d] none”).  
Moreover, the Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court has also suggested 
that tort claim notice is jurisdictional by describing it as “an indispensable jurisdictional 
prerequisite to the prosecution of common law tort claims against a public entity.”  State 
v. J.R.S., 939 A.2d 226, 229 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008).  Finally, to the extent this 
requirement is not jurisdictional, we also deem Melber’s argument that the Doctors failed 
to plead this affirmative defense waived because “ordinarily ‘an appellant’s failure to 
identify or argue an issue in his opening brief [the case here] constitutes waiver of that 
issue on appeal.’”  United States v. Andrews, 681 F.3d 509, 532 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting 
United States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 222 (3d Cir. 2005)).       
